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A Special Forces Warrior Sounds Off To:
All American Leaders who care Many Soldiers are dissatisfied with the way things are in the SOF community right now and are voting with their feet and leaving the ranks. The majority of these departures are the senior more experienced men. This results in a less experienced force. The reason they are leaving is not because they don't want to serve, not because they don't want to engage the enemy, not because they don't love their community and brethren. No, quite simply, they are not happy with they way things are going with their leadership. THE COMMAND STRUCTURE BETWEEN SOF AND CONVENTIONAL Situation: The Special Operations Forces (SOF) were placed under the Command of Conventional Forces when the nature of the conflict was clearly and primarily Unconventional in nature. Problem: Many times support requirements were denied and missions turned down due to lack of logistical and operational support because the reason for the request could not be understood and appreciated by the conventional command. This means that many enemy forces were not apprehended, and many that were could not be transported out which led to many forces not acting and many enemies remaining in place. The significance of this is that these enemies will destabilize the country at the first sign of our weakness or withdrawal. Solution: SOF should continue to work with Conventional forces and whether under their command or vice versa. They should not be deployed without having complete control of the assets necessary to successfully complete their required tasks and missions. When dealing with terrorist forces, a more aggressive posture should be permitted by the command or else the elite forces will be stifled and their overall objectives will fail. THE NATIONAL GUARD PROMOTION SYSTEM Situation: The Special Forces (SF) National Guard (NG) Commander was in charge of the SF Forces and provided outstanding leadership as did many of the SF NG Commanders at the Team level, Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA). However, there was a serious disconnect in between. Problem: Many of the middle management leaders unfortunately did not demonstrate good leadership and were the source of much unnecessary operational difficulties. This is in large part due to the promotion process within the NG. Unlike the federal reserves, the NG promotes based on politics, not competence. This manifests in incompetence at the middle levels where it can be hidden and covered. The result is that the higher commanders cannot achieve their goals and the lowest commanders cannot accomplish their missions. Solution: Sycophancy should be eliminated, and the promotion process removed from state authority and meritocracy should continue to be promoted within the ranks based on skills, schools and successful missions. THE ENEMIES Situation: Many of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Terrorist hid just across the border in Pakistan, and would not come into Afghanistan to conduct operations, knowing they were wanted, they would send benign underlings to do conduct operations against our forces. Problem: Many of the ring leaders could not be captured because the forces were not permitted to cross the border unless in hot pursuit, for which, the key leaders never provided such an opportunity. This will lead to a failed U.S. policy as these men will return because they are patient, and will wait for America to become tired of the costs of maintaining such vigilance and when we withdraw, they will return and revert things back to the way it was before, leading to the deaths of all those who supported the U.S. and causing the Mujahideen to feel abandoned by the U.S. again, sending them on Jihads against us, as they have successfully been exporting mercenary warriors for many years. Solution: We must commit to at least ten years in Afghanistan, despite the economic burden, or it will cost us a great deal more over time trying to make reparations for the damages caused by providing reason for the enemy forces to unite and rally against us. In addition, we must insist that Pakistan cooperate fully with us in the border regions, which they barely control and we must root out the ring leaders now or we will pay later. THE FRIENDLIES Situation: The Afghan National Army is not succeeding. It is made up of the minorities and not the majority population by nationwide percentages. It is ill equipped and not combat ready to assume the heavy burden of providing security and stability for the country. Problem: The majority population is Pashtun and until they recognize the government and army as legitimate, many will not join, leaving the provision of security up to the minority population and ensuring a lack of receptivity to their enforcement attempts if not outright animosity. As well, the Afghan troops are poorly equipped and supplied and the young men who want to serve cannot even join as there are no means to transport, in-process and facilitate them. It looks like a welfare army as a band-aid on the problem to facilitate an early withdrawal. Solution: We must spend more money to make this work. We must step in an provide all the means necessary to make this army work or our entire foreign policy here will fail and the repercussions of this as the entire Muslim world watches will be very far reaching and extremely detrimental to our nation in the not too distant future. DISCIPLINE AND MORALE Situation: Many men were threatened with legal and disciplinarian actions for having alcohol (beer), pornography (Playboy) or for having incorrect uniforms and non-regulations grooming standards. Problem: The SF men understand discipline and military bearing and professionalism. However it is difficult to tell mature men, seasoned professionals who have demonstrated their ability to operate alone and maintain a high representation of their country, that they can not conduct themselves privately as they would do so freely back at home in the states. We preach cultural awareness and appreciation to live like them, but we don't practice it enough. Solution: Stop babysitting the men like children. Treat them as men and they'll conduct themselves accordingly. "So a man thinketh…" Let them safely and privately enjoy some of the very freedoms they have at home and fight for abroad, other than of course, the fact that as civilians, they can carry weapons, but on the military bases they can not. When working with a culture of beards earning respect, we should let the men wear them. This is a heritage of Special Operations, we should embrace this aspect, not shun it. LIVING CONDITIONS Situation: The living Conditions in the main headquarters for the training base were sub-standard. The disciplinary threats are exacerbated by the fact that the command was quick to issues warnings , but hardly lifted a finger to improve living conditions, thus demonstrating a lack genuine care for the welfare of the troops they disciplined. Problem: Literally across the street, the Europeans lived quite well comparatively speaking, and the Americans were embarrassed and ashamed when the Europeans saw how poorly we lived and they simply couldn't understand the beer and playboy ban as they subsidized them for their soldiers. This did not represent America well and was a blow to morale for the U.S. Soldiers. Solution: Respect and responsibility is a two way street. Leaders should do all they can for their men as well as expecting the men to do all they can for them in return. If we are truly the world's leader, let us act like it and treat our soldiers as best we can in all cases. DEPLOYMENT Situation: The deployments were too long. This caused much hardship in terms of loss of jobs, and difficulties for families, many times, insurmountably so. Problem: If soldiers are to risk their lives for their country, we ought to try not and destroy their lives in the process. Solution: Make the deployments of shorter durations and with more rotations if need be like the Europeans do it on a 3-4 month basis. Two months preparation and two months of wind down make for a very long 6-12 month deployment. If we are in a war that requires lengthy deployments, then let us do so. But when we can, we should bring the troops home. PAY Situation: The SF Officers do not receive Special Forces Duty Pay of $225 per month like the Soldiers, Noncommissioned Officers and the Warrant Officers do. Problem: Officers will not voice this complaint, as it seems beneath the standard of the way to be. It was explained that the reason because they own SF. With that philosophy, they should also take away jump pay, and for that matter, all pay. Gone are the days when officers were a privileged class. Now they must support their families, as does everyone else. And they usually sacrifice the most time during their brief tour on a Team (ODA). Solution: Pay the Officers serving on SF Teams the SF Pay like the other team members for parity and make the time on the team for Officers longer so they actually can come to truly understand the operational environment before going onto staff and dictating policy without a firm grasp on what ODA's actually need, can and can not do. Let's give credit where credit is due and reward our leaders who risk their lives at the tip of the spear. ANNUAL EVALUATIONS Situation: The military evaluation process is highly unbalanced. We have inflated rating schemes and administrative processes, which do not accurately reflect the truth. Problem: This leads to improper promotions of inadequate leaders and the result in a wholly ineffective fighting force and low troop morale and retention issues as soldiers seek to leave their positions for finding a better leadership command and quality of life and service. Solution: We should create, at first, at least, experimentally, within the SOF community a methodology by which, we can have a bottom up perspective of the leadership. If we instituted a program by which, leaders, from ODA up to Group level were anonymously rated on say, ten leadership skill areas, on a scale of 1-10 by all their subordinates, and then this was tallied and those score reflected in one of the many bullet statements on the Officer Annual Evaluation Reports, we could have a better idea of how they were truly performing as perceived by their soldiers. It is this perception, which will determine their success on the battlefield, as troops will fight much more for a leader they respect and admire than for one they loathe and despise. This will assist the leaders in their self-development as well and can only improve the overall quality of the forces. OPERATIONS Situation: The NG has been misused. Not only do the NG SF missions seem to be mostly unsavory clean up and follow up operations, the men are not utilized to their fullest potential. Problem: The problem is not that the active can deploy more quickly than the guard as that is obvious. The issue is that once deployed, the NG SF should be given the same missions as their active duty counter part where appropriate. These men do not train and maintain their skills just to go to war and do police call and babysit. Most of the time, they have more skill and experience than the active duty soldiers as their full time jobs for the majority are Policeman, Fireman, Paramedic and Federal Agent. They risk their lives and save lives almost daily. The active SF soldiers do not. The main advantage the active has is in physical fitness and opportunity to have time with newer technology. In addition, the NG SF is treated like they just came to the game for mobilization and were kept for long periods pre and post deployment, sitting around doing nothing or being tested and evaluated as if they had never been trained in the first place. Solution: Recognize the skill sets that the NG SF men bring to the table and utilize them accordingly. Do not make these men take menial tasks when deployed. Do not waste their time before and after deployments keeping them even longer from their families, loved ones, homes and jobs. The active duty is at home and their job when they return and retrain/refit. The NG is not. Let them work as the active duty, then let them go home. This would best demonstrate a true understanding and appreciation of the NG SF element by the active duty component, as is not quite the case now. AWARDS Situation: The awards system is grossly unjust. It has always had issues and many old timers say it is so and can't be changed. I disagree. Problem: The problem is not that men only want badges, medals, awards and recognition, but that when given, it should be fair, just, true and right. This is what gives it meaning and value. Not only in terms of respect of subordinates to leaders who have earned them, and from leaders to subordinates, but in the eyes of American citizens when they see their nation's sons and daughters come home from or die in the war. IF our country's awards system fails to have significance, then our history will not ring true and our future truly bleak. As it stands now, awards are based mostly on rank and quotas. Solution: We have two categories of awards, administrative and combat. We must insist on ensuring that these standards are indeed met and quality controlled assured by multiple source recommendations and verification. We should remove all concepts of quota and rank as prerequisites for presenting awards. It should be true merit and truly earned, otherwise, our way of life is in jeopardy because our way of recognizing deeds has become false and therefore, our word and our commands become meaningless. CAREERS Situation: Careerism is debilitating the SOF community. Officers are now seeing the SF branch mainly as a means to get more schools and more promotions. This means they are squelching men on the teams during their brief tenure so that they take few risks, get into little trouble and then continue to climb ladders towards their personal goals. Problem: This stifles the men on the teams as they cannot do as much training, and it is not as qualitative as it could be leading to a less capable force on the whole. Also, the staple of SF is the Sergeant First Class (SFC/E-7) who when he retires, usually more physically broken from the wear and tear, and having usually suffered a broken marriage, and made a great deal more sacrifice than say, a clerk typist counterpart, and should be rewarded appropriately by being promoted to Master Sergeant (MSG/E-8). As it stands now, most men prefer to remain on the team and forego promotion, as there are so few E-8 slots. They then retire, at a lower rank and with less pay than the clerk who served 20 years at much less personal sacrifice. Solution: A significant change wherein Officers can remain on a team, if they enjoy and prefer it there, and they do well as measured by their performance over time. To compensate, they should be given annual pay increase much like the GS step system so they are not financially disadvantaged for their choice to remain on a team and decline promotion. In addition, the entire team rank scale should be raised up one level as they can command companies and battalions of indigenous forces, their rank should reflect this. LEADERSHIP Situation: Leadership has become checklist and format oriented and not instinctive and intuitive. Although there is a battle rhythm, no battlefield is in order. It is usually quite chaotic and is fought by small groups working together based on their training and following guidance based on their leadership. However, we teach leaders to go by checklist and look for proper format of tactics and techniques during the fight. Problem: We are teaching our leaders that if they follow the checklists, everything will be alright and it won't. They are not being taught to use their instincts and intuition when engaging the enemy. Without this, they are likely to meet with defeat in the absence of the heavy air, naval, and ground support to which they've become accustomed. Solution: We must step away from the zero defect tolerance attitude which debilitates us now and encourage leaders to explore and experiment as they engage the enemy. We must use checklists as starting points in training, not finishing with memorization but ending with understanding how to read an enemy and a situation and then creating a solution on the spot, under pressure, lacking time, men, equipment and logistics. This will raise proper warriors to lead our nations' men and women into battle. WARRIOR ETHICS Situation: The Warrior Ethic is not a wallet card, it is a way of life. We require soldiers to carry wallet cards and wear dog tags with the army values. We punish them if they do not have them. We have these posters and signs everywhere. Yet, we continue to baby our troops and and violate our own standards of discipline by not letting soldiers go who are not fit for our ranks. This denigrates the entire quality of the force. Problem: The system is so concerned with the numbers game they are losing sight of the quantity versus quality issues. We cannot as leaders let soldiers return to civilian life when they no longer desire to serve in our ranks. IT is extremely challenging for any leader to remove problematic soldiers from his chain of command. This deteriorates the morale of the group and decreases overall efficacy for mission success and quality of life. Solution: We should reverse our policies and let soldiers leave who do not desire tom serve. The times now permit it as many have a new found patriotism and seek to join. We can do more with less if that less is better quality. If we clean out the ranks of the non-performers we will achieve an optimal fighting force as those high achieving personalities will then be drawn to the force and will only enhance the overall capabilities. This is especially true of the soldiers in SF who seek to leave for a variety of reasons such as family, injury or simply occupational fatigue. And we should not seek to punish them as seems to be the case now by removing their Special Forces tab and thus denying all the good they have done in the past and the sacrifices they have made for us. Feedback concerning this article should be directed here |